The political shifts created by the 2024 South African elections were seismic by any measure and have deep implications for how South Africa navigates current crises ranging from energy, crumbling infrastructure and the generally poor policy performance towards the closing of the third decade of demdemocracy. That the African National Congress (ANC) will slip below the required majority to form government was expected, and yet the landing was harder than anticipated with the party that founded democracy in government hanging on to 40% of the support at national level. This was severe in provinces where the ANC lost control to govern on its own in Gauteng, Northern Cape, and KwaZulu-Natal.
The political shifts created by the elections were seismic by any measure and have deep implications for how South Africa navigates current crises ranging from energy, crumbling infrastructure and the generally poor policy performance towards the closing of the third decade of democracy. The main question that dominated the policy discourse in the period leading toward the election was whether a stable government will be in place to respond to these challenges after the elections. The anxiety around a stable government also shows how low the bar is in terms of what the electorate can live with given perennial crises due to poor governance by elected leaders.
In all honesty, South Africans have resigned themselves to political stability instead of efficiency and high performance as standards upon which to assess government. The ANC-led government has provided sufficient stability, yet the party has been remarkably lethargic in terms of sending its policy leavers to address challenges confronted by South Africans.
With the May 2024 elections however, the electorate seems to have had something else in mind, something more than just a stable government. Having realised that the only reasonable way to approach the reality of election results was to work with a political party that has functioned much closer to the centre than any other party in the country, the ANC opted to form a government of national unity which includes the largest opposition party in the country, the Democratic Alliance (DA). The enthusiastic response by the DA to participate in the ANC multi-party coalition government has been lauded as a sound response to the national crises.
Having squandered its political capital by allowing rampant corruption and the decline of service deli, the ANC has no option but to partner with opposition parties to regroup and find a way to mend the relationship with voters and claw back its majority, if that is still possible. Meanwhile, the DA will be using its place in government to ensure that the party is subsequently entrusted to govern efficiently on its own come the 2029 elections. As for the voters, the hope is that the net effect of this will be an improvement, and sound policy position based on the interests of the nation as opposed to a faction within a political party.
There is hope that the coalition arrangement under the umbrella of a government of national unity will address policy blockages where it matters most, for example when it comes to attracting investors and creating job opportunities for many. There are many policy areas in relation to which a political arrangement such as a government of national unity will bring benefits by way of instilling collective efforts and collective accountability. The DA and the ANC, being the two major parties participating in the recently formed government of national unity, already find each other when it comes to some key policy issues including the broader ideas in the National Development Plan (NDP). Now that the ANC will need to contend with coalition partners and not only consult internally on major policy issues; the party will also find it difficult to avoid consensus which requires yielding to partners. The hope is that coalition will reduce policy paralysis and set South Africa on a course of becoming an attractive investment destination. This hope can only be attained through a plan. There needs to be a clear plan among coalition partners regarding how they will co-govern and how they will collectively account for results.
Not all opposition parties acceded to the call to join a government of national unity. Among important players that have rejected the government of national unity are the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and the newly formed MK party. The question is whether a government of national unity will survive without participation of the two parties.
While speculations are rife regarding the potential of the government of national unity in turning things around in South Africa, much work still needs to be done in ensuring effective oversight remains the cardinal rule, particularly where the lines between governing party and opposition are slightly blurry as is the case in a government of national unity. This also requires vigilance by civil society organisations and the media in holding leaders to account. Public participation is critical in this regard, to ensure government is not far from the people.
| Introducing Dr Ralph Mathekga:
Dr Mathekga, PhD, started his studies in Political Science, Law and Economic History at the University of the Witwatersrand, where he completed a BA degree. He has subsequently completed an Honours and a Masters degree in Political Science, at the same university and a PhD in Political Studies, in a record two-year period, at the University of Johannesburg (2018). His thesis focused on the court challenges on affirmative action in South Africa and the implications on equality and justice. Mathekga also completed studies at the New School for Social Research, New York, where he spent three years researching and publishing and has completed post-doctoral studies at the University of Johannesburg.
Mathekga has worked as a political researcher with the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) where he focused on political, social and economic research; as a political science lecturer at the University of the Western Cape and as a senior policy analyst at the National Treasury (Ministry of Finance) in the Budget Office. Mathekga has written over 500 opinion articles over the years in various newspapers and magazines, both locally and internationally, and he regularly contributes content to The New York Times, Washington Post and Financial Times, among other publications. He is the author of the books: When Zuma Goes (Tafelberg, 2016); Ramaphosa’s Turn (Tafelberg, 2018) and The ANC’s last decade (Tafelberg, 2021). He is currently a senior expert at the Lichtenstein-based Geopolitical Intelligence Services (GIS), where he contributes reports focusing on trade, diplomacy and foreign relations in the SADC region. His Chapter “Coalition politics – is this the way” is forthcoming (Jacana, 2024) |
 Dr Ralph Mathekga. Supplied by Dr Ralph Mathekga |